How one Proof-of-Trust chain maps onto the Fractal Persistence Equation (FPE), what it preserves, what it scores, and how core predictions mirror aion-core core tasks.
Formal FPE: docs/glossary.md · Bridge essay: docs/geopolitics/predictive_governance_and_pot.md · Intra-node mirror: papers/society_of_aion_nodes.md · Payload types: data_content.md
Treat each PoT chain as a single information-persisting system \(\Sigma^{(L)}\): a society of Ed25519 participants (humans, agent fleets, operators) whose collective identity is the canonical git tree plus the append-only block payload.
PoT does not measure \(\mathcal{R}\) directly. It implements the Predictive Governance slice of FPE — public scored forecasts against resolved outcomes — and encodes the result as millitrust (mT, trustworthiness balance).
| FPE term | PoT reading |
|---|---|
| \(\Phi\) (substrate integrity) | Canonical git tree — runnable code, docs, configs the society actually merges |
| \(\Psi\) (shelter) | External guarantees outside the chain — fiat, law, hosting, operator decree |
| \(\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{KL}}\) (delusion divergence) | Gap between private beliefs \(q_v\) and realized outcomes \(y\) at finalize |
| \(\eta_I\) (coupling efficiency) | Strictly proper log score — honest probabilities maximize expected \(\Delta t\) |
| Numerator (usable power) | millitrust-weighted influence in fork choice, branch rank, and markets |
| Denominator (\(\omega\mathcal{E}_\Sigma\), \(\Gamma\)) | Compute cost (whitepaper §13), conflict backlog (conflict_records), unresolved norms |
| Society memory | Block payload + refs/pot/* — auditable history of bets, resolutions, patches |
Design goal: when \(\Psi\) weakens, the society can still persist because power follows calibration, not popularity or apex decree alone.
| Kind | Question | Mechanism | Example |
|---|---|---|---|
| Facts | What will happen / what is true? | Block votes, society markets, code-proposal bets | “This branch becomes HEAD”; “GPU supply normalizes by 2028” |
| Values | What rules do we bind ourselves to? | Norm adoption markets → refs/pot/norms/* |
“No production write without a peer-review market” |
| Core predictions | What world hypothesis are we trying to prove or disprove? | Core prediction registry → linked society market | “People want to stream movies”; “KL-scored trust beats PoW for agent societies” |
Do not collapse these. Norms are chosen constraints. Core predictions are testable bets about reality — the society’s reason for existing until scored. Generic society markets are optional side bets unless elevated to core status.
Each channel has: a question, private beliefs \(q_v\), trust-weighted market \(p_m\), realized outcome \(y\), and trust update
| Channel | IPS role | Realized outcome \(y\) | Payload fields | Hub tab (today) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Block votes | Which history is canonical? | Winning block at height \(h\) after \(K\) confirmations | votes |
Proposals (candidates) |
| Society markets | World-model bets | Resolver declares winning outcome label | market_decls, market_votes, market_resolutions |
Markets |
| Code proposals | Substrate evolution | Perpetual: oid on HEAD at finalize; v0.3: merged / expired | code_proposals, code_proposal_votes |
Proposals |
| Norms | Collective rules | adopt / reject at close | norm_decls, norm_votes, norm_resolutions |
Norms |
Hub note: code-proposal markets are real prediction markets but live under Proposals, not Markets, because they score substrate state, not arbitrary society questions.
Scoring reports are reconstructible from the canonical chain (whitepaper.md §7).
Use this inventory when onboarding operators, agents, or auditors.
| Artifact | Role | On canonical chain? |
|---|---|---|
Git tree (refs/heads/main) |
Substrate \(\Phi\) — the society’s runnable identity | Yes (chain is the repo) |
| Block payload history | Append-only audit log | Yes |
Trust ledger (trust_mtrust) |
Who earns weight from calibration | Yes |
| Society markets | Shared world model over declared questions | Yes |
| Core predictions | Foundational hypotheses — curated society markets the chain exists to score | Yes (proposed) |
Norms (refs/pot/norms/*) |
Agreed rules (values) | Yes (when adopted) |
| Code proposals / branch rank | Competing substrate futures | Yes |
| Conflict records / patches | Repair of \(\Gamma\) (damage backlog) | Yes (v0.4) |
| RBAC grants | Permission coupling graph | Yes (v0.4) |
| Compute attestations | Denominator: cost of deliberation | Yes (spec §15) |
| Hub discussions | Argument, review threads | No — hub-side, signed, not in block payload |
| Aion-core core tasks | Intra-node “what to work on” | No — processor-local; see §6 mirror |
Whitepaper §12: canonical history = friction → conflict → patch → trust update.
A member is an Ed25519 pubkey with:
trust_mtrust balancelabelnonce for replay protectionKey holder = participant. There is no separate account layer.
| Use | Effect |
|---|---|
| Block fork choice | Trust-weighted vote over candidates at \(h+1\) |
| Branch rank (v0.4) | Trust-weighted \(P(\text{on HEAD})\) picks canonical git_oid |
| Market aggregation | Trust-weighted \(p_m\) over outcomes |
| Transfers | Explicit delegation of standing (trust_txs) |
Temporary loss: wrong vs \(y\) → negative \(\Delta t\) before the world “proves you right”. Early accuracy: high \(q_v(y)\) when \(p_m(y)\) was low → large KL margin → durable standing.
Cost-adjusted trust (whitepaper §13): \(\Delta t_v = \alpha \cdot \text{margin} - \beta \cdot c_v\). Right but wastefully expensive deliberation can still lose net mT.
A core prediction is not an arbitrary society market. It is the foundational hypothesis the chain exists to test — the bet about the world that, if true, justifies the society’s substrate, norms, and continued existence.
In IPS terms, it is the society’s internal model claim at level \(L\): a falsifiable statement whose truth or falsity the society measures with \(D_{KL}\) over time. While unresolved it may be a hypothesis (plausible, worth testing) or a delusion (wrong but not yet scored); resolution is what separates them. The chain does not moralize the label — it scores calibration against the realized outcome.
| Product / project | Core prediction (informal) | What “yes” would mean |
|---|---|---|
| Netflix | People want to be able to stream movies at home | Demand for on-demand video persists; build infra and catalog |
| Finding information on the internet is hard but important | Search quality is worth paying for in attention and ads | |
| PoT / AGI chain | Public KL-scored forecasts allocate trust better than hash work or naked stake | Calibration becomes durable power; society persists when \(\Psi\) weakens |
Everything else on the chain — code proposals, norms, generic markets — is downstream: implementation bets and rules given one or more core hypotheses. Core predictions answer: why does this IPS exist, and what would prove it right or wrong?
| Layer | Core task (aion-core) | Core prediction (PoT) |
|---|---|---|
| Question | What should we do to persist? | What must be true for us to persist? |
| Root | parent_id == "" task tree |
Genesis + adopted hypothesis registry |
| Scheduling / power | \(P(\text{SUCCESS})\) drives compute | Outcome-market calibration drives mT |
| Operator seed | Sub-instruction after boot | Genesis core_predictions + resolver policy |
PoT can host permissionless society markets, but nothing names the small set of research questions the society treats as identity-defining — the inter-node analogue of “why we built this company.” Hub and agents cannot tell a side bet from the hypothesis the project is trying to prove or disprove.
Core predictions should be falsifiable and outcome-resolvable (height, date, or observable metric):
Contrast with a generic society market (not core): “Will Bitcoin exceed $100k this year?” — interesting, but not why the chain exists unless the society adopts it as a core hypothesis.
Early accurate bettors on the core outcome gain mT; overconfident wrong bettors lose influence until resolution — the same mechanism as any society market, but standing on core predictions should weigh more in hub prominence and agent prioritization (policy, not yet protocol).
max_core_predictions in ChainParams); typically 1–3 live hypotheses, like a research program’s stated aims.initial_accounts.flowchart TD
nom["Member submits CorePredictionNom\n(hypothesis, rationale, outcomes, resolver, stake_mtrust, p_adopt)"]
adoptMkt["Adoption market\nADOPT | REJECT"]
reject["REJECT → slash stake"]
adopt["ADOPT → spawn society market\nmark as core"]
reward["Return stake + adoption bonus to proposer"]
outcomeMkt["Active core prediction market\nbets until resolution"]
resolve["Resolver declares y\nKL score all bettors"]
nom --> adoptMkt
adoptMkt --> reject
adoptMkt --> adopt
adopt --> reward
adopt --> outcomeMkt
outcomeMkt --> resolve
| Phase | Object (proposed) | Scoring |
|---|---|---|
| Nomination | SignedCorePredictionNom |
Proposer locks stake_mtrust; rationale = why this defines the society; initial p_adopt on ADOPT |
| Adoption | SignedCorePredictionAdoptVote |
ADOPT vs REJECT market; min voters, threshold (reuse norm params pattern) |
| Active | Linked SignedMarketDecl + core: true flag in state |
Standard society market KL at resolution |
| Rejected | Nom closed | Stake slashed (burn or redistribute to REJECT-side bettors) |
| Adopted | Entry in ChainState.core_predictions |
Proposer: stake back + adoption_bonus_mtrust (chain param) |
Adoption reward (sketch):
where \(n_{\text{adopt voters}}\) counts distinct non-author ADOPT bettors — rewarding nominations that mobilize real deliberation.
Rejection penalty: stake_mtrust removed from proposer balance. Default: burn (Jensen tax) or credit to REJECT bettors proportionally to their KL contribution on the adoption market.
Normative: spec.md §18. Summary:
| Field | Purpose |
|---|---|
core_prediction_noms |
Signed nominations with locked stake |
core_prediction_adopt_votes |
Bets on ADOPT | REJECT for each nom |
core_prediction_adopts |
Resolution of adoption phase → spawns market id |
ChainParams extensions:
max_core_predictions: u32 // active cap
min_core_nom_stake_mtrust: u64 // minimum skin in the game
adoption_bonus_base_mtrust: u64 // reward on successful adoption
core_adopt_threshold_ppm: u32 // e.g. 700_000 = 70% ADOPT
min_core_adopt_voters: u32
Git refs (mirror markets/norms):
refs/pot/core-predictions/noms/<nom_id>
refs/pot/core-predictions/adopt-votes/<nom_id>/<voter_fp>
refs/pot/core-predictions/active/<market_id>
CLI (sketch):
git pot core nominate --as ALICE \
--hypothesis "People want to stream movies at home" \
--rationale "Netflix-shaped: justify catalog + CDN spend" \
--outcomes yes,no --resolver RESOLVER_FP --closes-at-height 50000 \
--stake 5000 --p-adopt 0.6
git pot core list # active + pending nominations
git pot core bet-adopt --nom ID --probs 0.8,0.2
git pot core bet --market ID --probs 0.7,0.3 # outcome market (same as society)
Hub: Core predictions section at top of Markets tab (badge distinct from generic society markets).
MCP / pot agent next: prioritize actions on open core predictions when the agent holds mT.
| Existing | Core prediction difference |
|---|---|
market_decl |
Anyone can declare; no adoption gate; not the society’s reason for existing |
norm_decl |
Values (rules), not a falsifiable world hypothesis |
code_proposal |
Substrate HEAD (“this branch wins”), not the exogenous bet the product tests |
A adopted core prediction is a society market under the hood, plus registry metadata (hypothesis statement, research rationale) and nomination economics.
Copy and complete for each deployment:
## Chain: <slug>
### Identity
- chain_id:
- genesis height / perpetual_from_height:
- explorer_url:
### Substrate (Φ)
- Canonical git remote:
- Merge policy (perpetual branch rank / manual advance):
### World model (facts)
- **Core predictions (hypotheses the chain exists to test):**
- H1: …
- H2: …
- Other society markets (side bets): …
- Resolvers (pubkeys / policies): …
### Values
- Adopted norms (`refs/pot/norms/*`): …
### Members
- Initial endowment policy:
- Active participants (count / top mT holders):
### Power routing
- alpha_mtrust_per_nat:
- K confirmations:
- author_cap_mtrust (branch self-bets):
### Denominator
- Compute attestation policy (β):
- Open conflicts (Γ):
### Off-chain
- Hub discussions enabled:
- aion-core mirror chain_id:
docs/glossary.md — FPE vocabularydocs/geopolitics/predictive_governance_and_pot.md — essay ↔︎ protocolwhitepaper.md — PoT mechanism and scoringdata_content.md — payload field indexperpetual_branch_governance_v04.md — substrate prediction channelagent_onboarding.md — participant workflowaion-core/docs/architecture/core_tasks_priority.md — intra-node mirror of core predictions| Concept | Status |
|---|---|
| Four resolution channels (§3) | Implemented (v0.2–v0.4) |
| IPS inventory / checklist (§4, §7) | This document |
| Core predictions (§6) | Specified — spec.md §18; types in pot-core::core_prediction |
| Core prediction state machine | Not implemented |
| Hub “Core predictions” UI | Not started |
Genesis initial_core_predictions |
Specified — spawn at chain init (not wired) |
Track implementation in spec.md §18.